Even though Lukashenko, a former collective farm chairman and border guard servant doesn't seem to be too sharp or, let's say, intellectually flexible, he instinctively makes use of all the shortcomings of the EU foreign policy, be it before or after its Lisbon reforms. That inconspicuously sly "bat'ka" – as Belarusians tend to call him, is a role model of how to swerve back and front in the crafted network structure of the EU foreign policy institutions and bilateral relations with its members (not to mention Russia). 

Scene from Minsk, Elections 2006

So, what of "the keys" that Eva Neklyaeva was talking about? What can the EU do with the infamous last dictator on the Old Continent apart from banning from skiing in the Alps (and then after a while, perhaps Russia's more active initiatives in the region would enable him to visit his favourite resorts in that snowy wonderland once again)? 

The most common EU idea for Belarus is so called "twin-track policy". Briefly speaking, it consists of some economical or travelling restrictions (for regime servants) on the one hand, and supporting the opposition and civil society on the other. Hence, if Lukashenko behaves well, the EU would offer some financial help, investments or (recently) participation in the Eastern Partnership. But, unfortunately Lukashenko isn't too interested in this type of cooperation - that is, investments in exchange for democratisation. What's more, even in the most visible "twin-track" periods, the balance of trade with the EU countries has held on. So, why should Lukashenko do anything if he has everything that he actually wants? It would be too much to say that EU policy is totally insufficient for Belarus. Of course, the most visible successes for Belarusians are achieved by the nation states (mainly: Sweden, Germany, Netherlands and Poland) but these are in fact countries acting in the name of the whole community.

But would some stricter EU approach be more efficient? That's another complication. The official response would be something like: "The West/ the EU is oppressing Belarus, so why should we listen to them?”. Even though the media don't enjoy too much confidence among Belarusians, the "supporting image" of the EU would be blurred. Secondly, according to Aleksandr Milinkevich, it's crucial to keep some form of "twin-track" approach and not hurt Belarusian society, so any "economical restrictions" should be thought over twice before being implemented. 

"Holding the keys" isn't enough. In the light of the complicated nature of post-soviet geopolitical area and the still laboriously slow foreign policy of the EU (especially in its Eastern dimension) helping the Belarusians remains a serious problem. Achieving the liberation of imprisoned opposition activists and some small "thaw" after the frosty post-election month should be relatively simple. I hope that the European diplomats will remember "the undiplomatic words" of Eva Neklyaeva: "I am sick and tired, with all respect, of the analysts who say that in this situation it is very difficult for Europe or for the West to take serious steps because of the economic situation. To hell with realpolitik. These are human lives now on the line."

Lead Image: Mb7art